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The Futures of Canadian Governance: 
Foresight Competencies for Digital Public Administration 
Peter Jones, OCAD University
Introduction 
Much of the current research and discussion reporting on digital governance attends to the 
technosphere, with studies informing of the challenges and developmental opportunities for 
civil service in digital management, information technology, technology trends, and social 
media. Accordingly, several articles within the special issue collection report on the adoption 
and realization of digital competencies within government to deliver and improve public 
services or engage citizens in the digital sphere (Lindquist, 2017, Brown & …, 2017). Others 
develop accounts of digital policy design (Clarke and xxx, 2017), and dealing with regulation in 
the rapidly digital public sphere (Dutil, 2017). Important concerns of temporality, trend, and 
uncertainty are implicated across the entire project of anticipating and advising future directions 
of digital governance. These concerns for anticipating and predisposition are functions of 
strategic foresight, and demand the cultivation of rigorous futures thinking and modeling within 
current policy practices.  
Strategic foresight develops a range of competencies instrumental in envisioning future 
strategies, informing planning alternatives and strategic options through application of expert, 
evidence, creative and collaborative methods. Foresight methods enable anticipatory reasoning 
and formal speculation about possible and probable future outcomes to facilitate current 
situational decision making. Strategic foresight methods in policy and governance contexts has 
enjoyed a long history, especially in Canadian public administration. However, as we consider 
the disruptive and abrupt changes to information and communication technology, consumer 
trends, new Internet media, and the impact of trends on governing, we find significant 
uncertainty in strategy and decision making. Governments are not organized across departments 
and functions to take advantage of broad-based foresight advising that might affect multiple 
policy functions.  
Responding to the emerging challenges in digital era governance, we might address the value of 
foresight to three of the most relevant issues associated with digital era governance research: 
 Developing an innovative and resilient public sector for the digital age; Anticipating the evolution of Westminster institutions for the digital age; Guiding long-range planning in the face of greater uncertainty, requiring collaboration
across boundaries to improve digital era governance.
These issues require qualified observations about future social and technological trajectories 
affecting policy design, governance, service provision, and management decision making.  
Foresight artifacts and futures models are best realized as inputs to early policy formation, where 
possible second-order effects and future consequences of policy implementation can be 
anticipated before policy proposals become locked in and resistant to alteration.  
The inclusion of rigorous strategic foresight into policy advising and services design ought to be 
welcomed by civil servants, but as with any process methodology, the proof of adoption lies in 
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the cultural fit and the quality of execution. In current practice, there are at least three 
communities of advising and several policy formation paradigms within policy advisory systems 
(Craft & Howlett, 2013), and not all may be apprised of foresight modalities. Foresight studies 
have typically been “imported” into advisories by external knowledge producers, unless 
commissioned within government offices by internal knowledge brokers (such as Canada’s 
Policy Horizons group). Across contemporary governments we have seen a growing preference 
for evidence-based, quantitative methodologies (e.g., data analytics, targeted surveys and 
demographic estimation), which might seem incompatible with futures studies. Yet the 
contributions of foresight, such as trend scanning, scenarios and future proposals, provide critical 
guidance for defining policy hypotheses, constructing policy business cases, and selecting key 
developing trends for deep study. These applications are far upstream from policy analysis and 
service delivery. Foresight provides complementary modes of advising and policy priority 
formation are critical and timely in research purporting to inform the future models for public 
administration and service provision in Canada.  
 
Policymakers are challenged to produce relevant, accountable, and adaptive policy products, and 
have traditionally favoured quantitative forecasting, surveys and expert advising over foresight 
and ethnographic field studies in problem areas of interest. Forecasting (the attempt to identify 
highly probable outcomes from statistical trend analysis and modeling) and strategic foresight 
are significantly different research modes. Forecasting can be defined as “more or less linear 
systematic estimations, statements, extrapolations, projections, or predictions of highly probable 
future events” (Kuosa, 2014).They represent entirely different epistemologies, yet in policy 
advising both are helpful and even complementary. The practices must not only be integrated 
and synthesized methodologically within the policy organization, but the products of foresight 
must also be acknowledged and acted upon as legitimated knowledge in decision making. 
 
The evidence-based paradigm values objectivist, quantified statistical arguments over qualitative 
narratives, which can be perceived as anecdotal or cherry-picked constructions. However there 
are well-established problems with reliance on statistical evidence for forecasting or trend 
anticipation (Taleb & Blythe, 2011). There may be a false sense of security or reliability in 
policy forecasting using statistical inferences based on population samples from the recent past. 
Advanced probability reasoning identifies lower-probability but possible “tail risk” events within 
long-standing situations that are unforeseeable with basic surveys and targeted sampling. The 
rapid disruption of established incumbents by innovative upstarts in consumer and international 
markets demonstrates the cost and impact of foresight failure. The lack of on-the-ground insight 
and cultural context in international and foreign political situations incurs similar “Black Swan” 
risks of unexpected occurrences. With today’s digital era trends, the rate of change outpaces the 
technologists and digital strategists. As governments are not recognized as equipped to lead the 
design and implementation of information technology, the perceived gap between current 
practice and digital era competency continues to expand. While digital era policy making may be 
starting to close this gap through better advising and knowledge mobilization, the missing 
capability may be the organizational capacity to project and reason in a variety of longer 
temporalities for anticipation in complex social and technology domains. 
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Contexts of Canadian Policy Foresight 
Strategic foresight has its roots as a fairly esoteric, yet methodical practice led by futurists and 
business scenario planners, developed over years from a history of advising government, policy 
and corporate management. It has developed over the last decade through applied research and a 
flourishing of new methodologies across sectors. In particular, government foresight has been 
developed over roughly 50 years from a craft practice informing strategic advisors in national 
security to now assisting public servants in making sense of critical future challenges characterized 
by uncertainty and longer time horizons. In Canadian governments, strategic foresight has 
developed as a significant practice for informing public service leaders incorporating a wide range 
of methodologies (Martin, 2010, Miles, 2010). However, critiques are justified in suggesting that 
policymakers and public administration scholarship have not afforded effective and influential use 
of foresight for informed prospective reasoning about possible future outcomes (Roberge and 
Dinning, 2013). 
 
Foresight, unlike forecasting, is distinguished by its projection into longer-term future time 
horizons that obviate the possibility of prediction. As a practice it engenders a change to 
organizational mindset as much as methods. In policy domains (Miles, 2010) the participation 
and views of multiple experts and stakeholder help build knowledge and consensus around 
foresight activities. Some of the most common techniques in public administration are trend 
analysis, scenario formation, and strategy analysis. Foresight involves trend scanning of 
information to identify social and systemic forces, technology trends, and the “signals” that 
indicate directions and the emergence of different future outcomes. Emerging practices in 
foresight include anticipatory design, collaborative foresight for long-term planning (Weigand, et 
al, 2014), future challenges formulation (Glenn & Gordon, 2001), and developing futures literacy 
as an organizational competency (Miller, 2007) 
 
Strategic foresight enables better policy making by developing insights about possible future 
directions (typically in scenarios) and enabling collective understanding. It is a rapidly growing 
practice area, with governments and corporations worldwide investing in foresight capabilities, 
with distinctive differences found between nations, sectors, and industries. A small number of 
academic programs train foresight practitioners, including the seminal Hawaii Research Center 
for Futures Studies (HRCFS, at the University of Hawaii at Manoa) and the University of 
Houston’s M.S. in Foresight in the US. In Canada, OCAD University’s Strategic Foresight and 
Innovation program (an MDes design degree) has graduated learners from its interdisciplinary 
program since 2010; many of which have entered public service as foresight analysts in the 
energy, urban planning, and healthcare sectors. Foresight research is published in numerous 
journals, with notable well-ranked journals that inform public administration research including 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 
and Research Policy. Specialized foresight journals include Futures, Foresight, Journal of 
Futures Studies, Omega, and European Journal of Futures Research. As typically incorporated 
in policy studies, foresight, trends, and futures studies are integrated within briefs and 
backgrounders supporting policy formulation. Many such studies are provided as widely-ranging 
advance materials, such as the HRCFS annual reports to the Hawaii State Legislature informing 
lawmakers of emerging trends and cutting-edge political ideas from foresight studies.  
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Most governments have developed foresight capabilities for informing critical future-sensitive 
functions, especially defense, energy, technology R&D, and economic development. Canada, 
perhaps uniquely, has actively developed its foresight capabilities in public policy advising 
continuously over decades. Thompson (1992) notes the importance of this area in the founding 
of the Canadian Association for Futures Studies first conference in 1976, on Canadian Public 
Policy and Futures Studies. Rosell and Canadian civil service leaders convened a series of 
roundtables and authored two books (Rosell, 1992, 1995) formulating early proposals on 
governance in the future information society. Since 1996 the Canadian government has sustained 
the interministerial foresight advisory group, Policy Research Initiative (PRI), transforming to 
Policy Horizons Canada. Policy Horizons is a dedicated policy foresight organization within the 
Government of Canada (now part of the Privy Council Office) that commissions and leads 
numerous studies for government agencies, policy problem areas, as well as exploratory futures 
projects to inform ministries and the public service.  
 
The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC, 2012) initiative Imagining 
Canada’s Future exemplified a unique, significant social foresight exercise conducted across 
Canadian provinces with a wide range of experts and participants. The purpose of the initiative 
was to elicit multiple foresight responses from six regional panels, independent social futures 
studies conducted by different university-led teams in their regions. The results from the regional 
panels were reported and further developed into scenarios and critical challenges for the long-
term, proposed as futures challenges to inspire and engage social sciences and humanities 
research in scholarly communities and Canadian society. After the foresight development phase 
(panels and findings) six future policy challenges (and four cross-cutting themes) were 
articulated. These range from new educational models for Canada, aboriginal ways of knowing, 
global peak population, and the future of knowledge practices. The program continues into a 
second five-year initiative following the completion of research and engagement responses, 
including study proposals and symposia, following the six future challenges. 
 
Europe, Germany, and the UK have sponsored continuous agenda-level strategic foresight since 
the 1990’s. The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research sponsored the Futur 
program in 1999 (Da Costa, et al, 2008), a series of foresight activities over a number of years, 
inviting citizen participants in multiple workshops over a series of engagements, focusing on 
Mobility and Communication and Health and Quality of Life. The UK’s Nesta organization, 
which only five years ago launched the UK Alliance for Useful Evidence (Neville, 2011), now 
presents as an innovation centre, with little attention to evidence-based policy in it its 
foregrounded materials. Nesta promotes the value of strategic foresight to policymakers, and 
numerous trends reports and forecasts are available online. The European Union Horizon 2020 
program has sponsored numerous social research studies driven by foresight approaches. The 
CIVISTI (Citizens visions on Science, Technology and Innovation) project and method reported 
by Gudowsky and Peissl (2016) adopted a citizen engagement approach to developing demand-
side “preferred futures” from citizens to guide social policy and technology assessment.  
Buttressing a foresight-oriented technology analysis approach, the CIVISTI participatory 
methodology was developed as a counter to the focus on Grand Challenges approaches to future 
studies for science and technology innovation (STI) studies (Boden, Johnston, and Scapolo, 
2012).  
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The scale and reach of these social foresight research engagements in Canada and other nations 
for policy and governance advising suggests that these methods can have a vital and productive 
role. Many demonstrate a considered balance between evidence-based social science and the 
provocations of futures thinking methods. Demonstrating the impact of insights from foresight 
studies, even when successfully broadening the horizons of policy-makers remains a continuing 
challenge because, not only is it competing with other forms of evidence and influence on policy 
making, it is geared to raising awareness of possible futures and not directly tabling options. 
Foresight Modes and Methods 
Serious foresight initiatives always engage multi-method processes and generally extend any 
study across multiple domains of trend and inference, such as the canonical STEEP/V categories 
(social, technological, economic, environmental, political and value-based issues), (Durst, et al, 
2015). Contemporary foresight studies typically develop prospectives (e.g. future outlooks) that 
draw on methods beyond typical scenarios and trend analysis. Because foresight studies 
necessarily rely on counterfactual proposals, or speculative projections about possible or 
preferred futures, Indeed, many foresight insights arise from imagining and reasoning about the 
future using and combining different forms of evidence. Foresight relies on interpretive and 
abductive reasoning from ambiguous and often provisional present data. Most foresight, 
including trends analysis, resists extrapolation from “hard evidence” such as quantitative survey 
studies. The assumptions of continuity from present observable trends stems from well-known 
cognitive biases, but foresight considers extrapolation extremely misleading. In order to 
thoughtfully consider the complexity of multiple future trends and social drivers, multiple 
foresight methods are selected for their relationship to each other and impact on policy-making.   
 
Foresight and scenario development are typically sponsored by top leaders of organizations and, 
in government, these are usually deputy ministers.  At their most effective, foresight methods 
cohere to present a compelling range of futures outcomes and options, infused by rhetoric and 
symbols appropriate to the enterprise. Executives (and ministers) are charged to become leaders 
by producing effective narratives, essentially futures storytelling, aligned with policy goals and 
strategies. In these various embodiments of future narratives, multiple pathways to future 
outcomes are often constructed to reveal a range of potentials and points of action. Future issues 
and possible conflicts and risks can then be identified and safely discussed as salient future 
concerns, even though there may be significant present-day implications.   
Foresight Methodology 
Strategic foresight methodology has traditionally been informed by technology futures and 
forecasting, as the major trends of the information age (starting 50 years ago) portended 
significant changes in policy and governance. Technological forecasting ranged from strong 
evidence-oriented methods such as surveys and trend mapping, to mixed qualitative approaches 
such as Delphi, horizon scanning, and expert panels, to more creative methods such as scenario 
design, near-future fiction, and wind tunneling. For much of its history, foresight practitioners 
tended to be technology futures experts and advised governments on near future trends for 
investment and strategic technology development.  
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Foresight practice has evolved to embrace a range of methods appropriate for informing 
governance, innovation and technology investment, and policy development. While there were 
always sociocultural futurists among practitioners in government, foresight led with a clear 
technology bias, as social norms could be tracked tangentially to technology adoption. Miles (2010) 
and others have developed and advocated foresight methods for anticipating impacts of technology 
on markets, organizations and government policy. Technology trends are perceived as reliable (in 
that technologies have visible developmental trajectories and well-known adoption patterns). 
Changes to collective social behaviors and norms, while also slow moving in development, can 
present rapid and unexpected, poorly-predicted shifts. The recent trend toward populist politics and 
the movement toward decolonization in public sector institutions, drawing from indigenous 
activism, were not apparent trends even two years ago. 
 
A significant enabler is the development of futures literacy (Miller, 2007), as an organizational 
capability and orientation to foresight in practice. Methods employed to prepare scenarios or 
reports without the receptivity of futures-literate stakeholders result in the failure to absorb or 
socialize the meaning of foresight studies for strategic or policy decision making. 
 
Different foresight methodologies employ many of the same methods but for different purposes 
and orientations toward the future.  There are no academic or industry standards in foresight 
practice, which can lead to a lack of robust commitment to its products. Foresight as a futures 
literacy (Miller, 2007) is an approach that develops the organizational capacity to explore and 
extend knowledge from the present to understand and create scenarios for projecting “possible, 
probable, and desirable” futures.  Ringland (2010) developed strategic foresight for surfacing 
assumptions and mental models, encouraging reflection, understanding complexity, and 
extending collective vision beyond the boundaries of organizational knowledge.   
 
Along with trend analysis, scenario planning might be the best known of foresight methods, as it 
has enjoyed years of development in corporate contexts as a strategic planning process. Scenario 
planning (design or development) is one of the oldest futures thinking techniques, deriving from 
Herman Kahn’s employment of strategic Nash-equilibria game scenarios for plotting out the 
mutual assured destruction deterrence scheme of the Cold War (Sigal, 1979). Scenario modeling 
has since found extensive application in corporate planning, especially following groundbreaking 
applications such as the Shell strategic oil exploitation scenarios developed in the 1980s 
(Schoemaker & van der Heijden, 1995) and developed methodologically in the business literature.  
Scenario planning developed into a canonical method, drawing on environment scanning and 
assessment of critical uncertainties, mapped into 2x2 matrices for the typical quadratic framework 
enshrined as practice by the Global Business Network (Ringland and Schwartz, 1998). 
 
A systematic review of scenario methods (Varum and Melo, 2010) shows over a hundred 
references to models for scenario planning for foresight across all sectors with nearly 30 different 
purposes for which scenarios have been employed. Among these we find Schnaars’ (1987) early 
attention to two broad approaches of scenarios. These were distinguished as those used to inform 
optionality and strategic decision making, and those used in framing emerging ideologies to 
consider a range of perspectives among actors in a policy area.   
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Mapping Foresight Methods to Applications 
A variation of the Popper (2008) “diamond” framework is presented in Figure 1 showing a range of 
methods organized on spectra between the following dimensions: from evidence to creative 
speculation (e.g., design fiction); and from reliance on expertise to collaborative interaction. 
Methods are colour coded by research modality, designated as qualitative, quantitative, or semi-
qualitative (a Popper distinction). The selection or mix of methods employed can be considered 
epistemological choices enabling consideration of the evidence-orientation of sponsors or foresight 





























Figure 1. Foresight methods by modality (adapted from Popper, 2008) 
 
Only three “pure” quantitative methods are indicated in the diamond framework and 18 are purely 
qualitative, which indicates a bias toward constructivist or interpretive modes. A plurality (16) are 
described as semi-qualitative and adaptable to data analysis and presentation in either more 
positivist (“evidence-based”) or interpretive modes of discourse. These variations are useful to 
consider when interpretivist foresight studies (as arguably most are) are conducted for evidence-
based applications such as (typically used) in public administration. Quantitative methods, 
typically including surveys as part of foresight projects conducted for strong evidence 
organizations, are often selected within a mix of modes to strengthen the statistical evidence basis 
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for a foresight brief that might influence decision making. A balanced mix of both types of 
methods can support policymakers in identifying critical trends and categories for further in-depth 
research. 
 
The foresight literature generally presents methodologies as collections of methods for specific 
clients and outcomes (technology foresight), that cohere together (e.g., scenario planning) or were 
developed from an authorial perspective (e.g. Godet’s La Prospective (1982) or Miller’s Futures 
Literacy, (2007)). The Popper diamond visually organizes a collection of methods and can serve as 
a comprehensive table of references, however it does not suggest guidance for method selection for 
types of foresight problem areas. When informing government and policy-making communities, 
foresight practitioners employ various mixes of methods. Emerging foresight methodologies are 
increasingly integrating with policy analysis, design thinking, social and long-term innovation, 
anticipatory systems science, and systemic design (Jones, 2014).   
 
Four approaches are drawn from the range of applications applicable to policy and governance 
problem domains as reference for method selection in advising. These are identified in Figure 1 
and defined below. 
 
Foresight-led Policy Advising. Figure 1 shows typical methods including: Scenarios, Three 
Horizons, Backcasting, Roadmapping, Interviews, Expert panels, Dialogic Design and Delphi. 
Other methods appropriate in policy advising include those in the Evidence section: Surveys, 
Literature Review, Horizon scanning, Trends/signals, Critical technologies, Cross-impact 
analysis, and Benchmarking.  
 
Foresight has evolved and adapted from its tradition of technology-centric futures studies to a 
strategic discipline accepted in an advisory capacity. Policy advising and strategic planning are 
the two major applications for taking action on foresight. Foresight-led policy studies have been 
commissioned to develop trends and foresight prospectuses for the most recent decade by EU 
and Canadian governmental organizations. (US-based studies are often produced by private 
companies for government and may be less publicly accessible). According to an international 
review by Dreyer and Stang (2013) EU projects have included the European Foresight Platform 
(2009-2012), FORLEARN (2005-2008), and iKnow (2008-2011), all of which are accessible 
online. Major Canadian programs have been noted previously (canada@150 and the Horizons 
Metascans) but many direct commissioned studies will remain inaccessible to the public.  
 
Collaborative and Participatory Foresight. Figure 1 indicates Workshops, Dialogic Design, 
Scenarios, Polling and Surveys (participatory platforms) and mixed methods. Scenarios, and 
creative methods such as Brainstorming, Bodystorming, and Tangible futures are also prevalent. 
Within the structure of collaborative workshops, expert-led methods are often integrated, as in 
the appropriation of Three Horizons in the study reported in this article. 
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This approach engages stakeholders as well as subject experts in futures studies, for the purposes 
of increased diversity and broader knowledge, to identify trends or emerging challenges from a 
larger sample, and to enhance the mobilization of foresight findings among the policy or sponsor 
user community. Collaborative foresight typically refers to methods where specific stakeholders, 
often selected for expertise, are engaged for one or a series of facilitated, collaborative 
workshops for foresight-led planning and scenario creation (Weigand, et al, 2014). The Weigand 
case describes a dialogic design methodology employed with (US Air Force) government lab 
experts in developing alternative approach to long-horizon R&D strategic planning. As a 
collaborative foresight case, it also drew on expert knowledge and was compatible with policy 
formation. Other studies in the field and literature describe large-scale and long-term 
collaborations such as the Millennium Project and EU research studies.1 
 
Participatory or ‘open’ foresight (Miemis, et al, 2012) refers to more distributed or crowdsourced 
methods, where multiple participants, typically not experts, are invited to contribute to a large 
trends study, surveys, or open platforms for voluntary participation. Participatory and 
collaborative foresight approaches have gained considerable respect in policy studies and in the 
field. Foresight methods over the decade appear to be following the trend of design research 
toward co-creation modalities (Sanders and Stappers, 2008), characterized by a movement from 
expert-led evidence-grounded studies to justify large design proposals toward design concepts 
co-developed with users and producers.  
 
Expert-led Technology Foresight. Selected expert-led methods in Figure 1 include Interviews, 
Expert panels, Delphi, Roadmapping, and Ethnography. Other expert methods include Horizon 
scanning, Trends/Signals, Critical technologies, and Three Horizons.   
 
These studies represent the traditional mode of futures research, developing future dossiers based 
on trends analysis and often led by technology trend foresight. Expert methods are called for 
when science and technology evolution and implications are required as significant inputs to 
policy planning. Expert studies are favoured for advising such areas as energy policy planning 
and urban infrastructure investment, technology and innovation R&D investment priorities, long-
term information technology planning and technology-driven domains such as healthcare, media, 
and finance. Future use cases of scenarios in these domains are often developed in mixed 
stakeholder engagements, but trends and scenario development are primarily expert-led, as the 
assessments of technology policy require technical judgment and scientific evidence. An 
exemplary expert-led study includes the Media Futures 2020 study (van Alstyne, et al, 2011), the 
public dossier report indicates 18 media (expert stakeholder) partners conducted for Ontario 
Media Development Corp. In essence a policy advisory document, the Media Futures 2020 
project developed a set of scenarios (complemented by a number of contributing methods) 
supporting near-future development of the Ontario media industry. While the foresight methods 
were conducted in collaborative workshops, the methods were appropriately selected to elicit 
                                                          
1
 Examples include the massively participatory Millennium Project (Glenn and Gordon, 2001), sourcing problems 
and trends from over 250 original participants and analyzing these to result in a problematique of 15 consistent 
global issues. The Millennium Project succeeded by distributing its trend sourcing to multiple country “nodes” with 
dedicated researchers contributing intelligence on a continuing basis, reporting on an annual basis. Other notable 
initiatives include the European Union FORLEARN study (Da Costa, et al, 2008) and the canada@150 program 
(Government of Canada, 2010). 
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stakeholder expertise to develop a robust foresight product. 
 
 
Social Foresight Research. Figure 1 shows that social foresight research draws on: interviews, 
expert panels, surveys, stakeholder analysis, Horizon scanning/Trends/Signals, Dialogic Design, 
and others. 
 
What we now refer to as social futures research has a long history in policy studies, as policy 
studies have always entailed an anticipation of future collective behavior. Harold Lasswell’s 
social planetarium (Laswell, 1959, 1970) presented early proposals in policy and political studies 
as a means for envisioning alternative future proposals, engaging citizens in rational discourses 
to arrive at possible scenarios and options. Christakis (1973) and Ozbekhan’s (1969) normative 
planning methods adopted a social systems approach to preferred futures. Social foresight 
research is primarily oriented toward inquiry and understanding of social behaviours and trends 
in present society that might inform future social phenomena and contribute to policy an 
governance. Social foresight studies are typically incorporated within the disciplinary domain of 
interest, whether urban planning, human geography, foreign policy. The SSHRC Imagining 
Canada’s Future initiative (SSHRC, 2012) would be considered a model process for a large 
cross-national foresight initiative in Canada, drawing on multiple sample and methods. 
 
 
Foresight in Action: Canada and Beyond 
Canadian government demonstrates a continuing development of capacity in strategic foresight 
and shows a history of major engagements and publications over decades. Exemplary cases can 
be selected from as far back as the 1960’s, with key historical markers such as the establishment 
the Ministry of State for Science and Technology in 1971, and interdepartmental Committee on 
Technological Forecasting set up in 1973 in the new ministry (Thompson, 1992). More recent 
cases reveal a formative era of modern foresight practices commonly in use today, such as 
multidisciplinary collaboration, trend analysis, and scenario planning.  These range from the 
Changing Maps public service roundtables (Rosell, 1995) with significant expert involvement, to 
the recent Policy Horizons (2013) Metascan3 and Canada @150 (2010). Canada’s federal 
government and public service leaders have effectively drawn on advanced contemporary futures 
methods across many sectors of public administration, for envisioning probable scenarios and 
defining policy options for their emergence. Policy Horizons is perhaps unique among 
governments as an internal strategic foresight advisory that facilitates foresight studies, futures 
research for policy issues, and commissions and investigates technology evolution and impact. 
While many studies are commissioned as internal advisories, Policy Horizons also serves a 
significant role in knowledge mobilization from its studies. The Metascans series of technology 
foresight impact reports are developed with support from private experts, and are publicly 
accessible and promoted.  
 
Foresight in Canadian governance has been employed effectively, as an educating and or even 
visionary process to broaden horizons about emerging and critical trends. Foresight methods also 
serve as engagement and thinking practices that break through the normative consensus mental 
models common in public sector and promote divergent and imaginative projections of possible 
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futures. Extrapolation into future trajectories from evidence and consensus thinking 
accommodates the significant risk of ignoring or overlooking the potential of future disruptions 
to policy and service from emerging trends that evolve over time, or statistically improbable but 
devastating “tail risk” events, known as Black Swans (Taleb & Blythe, 2011). If foresight is 
ignored or underused in policy planning and research, governments may be missing 
opportunities for guiding policy and planning decisions informed by rigorous, and often 
provocative, futures prospectives. 
 
In the Canadian government, the reported cases from 1996 through late 2000’s shows continuing 
exploration from trend analysis and technology scans, to comprehensive multidisciplinary horizon 
scans (e.g., Metascans), to more recently, innovative collaborative studies such as the 
Canada@150 study. The predominating tenor of Canadian foresight has focused on large-scale 
problem areas of interest to specific government or industry sectors, such as the Canadian media 
industry, internet technology, healthcare, technology sector development, or the energy sector.  
 
The literature of foresight applications and practice cases show a significant progression of 
contemporary methodologies advising public policy and public service programs. While advising 
government, futures studies are typically invested in policy domains and major economic and 
social trends, and not about government or public administration as the subject of foresight. In the 
aforementioned study (Canadian Governance in the Digital Era) the future of government is 
situated as the future object. 
 
Other governments, including the European Commission, UK, Australia, and Dubai have recently 
expanded their foresight capabilities by developing internal organizations or commissioning 
comprehensive studies (such as those from advisories such as the International Futures Forum and 
Institute for the Future). Da Costa et al (2008) reviews the extensive European foresight series 
known as FORLEARN directed to inform policymaking and convene a mutual learning network 
of policymakers, advisors, and science and technology (S&T) experts. It emphasized that the 
connection of foresight activities to actual policy change may be more tenuous than often 
idealized in foresight-led policy studies. The FORLEARN program (a major engagement series 
largely convened between the years 2005–2008) proposed six contributions to public policy 
functions that apply to the Canadian context and serve arguments for foresight in governance:  Informing policy – Foresight provides emerging ideas and options for policymakers as an 
input to policy design and prioritization.   Facilitating policy implementation – Implementation and the choice of policy instruments 
are guided by foresight through a shared model of future scenarios or trends, enabling 
awareness of critical uncertainties and future challenges,     Enabling participation in policymaking – In Europe the goal was to involve and embed 
citizen participation in foresight and inform the resulting policy proposals, enabling 
transparency and legitimacy.   Supporting policy definition - Foresight outcomes are translated from collective 
engagements into policy design options for definition and implementation.   Reconfiguring the policy system – Futures thinking can change the policy process to 
ensure longer-term challenges are fully considered.   Symbolic functions – Communicating to the public that new policies are developed from 
rigorous approaches to analysis of trends and evidence. 
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Each of these six functions of strategic foresight requires different method selection, well-
planned engagements with experts or stakeholders, and design processes for produced artifacts 
and communications.  The selection of specific foresight methods for a policy program remains 
an expert judgment, as there are no standards or guidelines accepted across foresight practices 
(or policy studies for that matter). While many advisors and practices are known for scenario 
planning, trend analysis, or narrative fiction, for examples, it would be a mistake to adopt one 
methodology for every futures analysis. As in design research (Jones, 2014) models that guide 
selection and adaptation of methods for thoughtful adaptation to a problem are more effective 
than prescriptive guidance of conventional methods.  
 
In many large programs such as those cited (e.g., Millennium Project, FORLEARN, Metascans) 
we have seen foresight platform resources developed and maintained throughout at least the 
course of the project. A foundation foresight platform consists of an online website with 
stakeholder participant recruitment and registration, the presentation of foresight tools for 
elicitation of responses, and the dissemination of interim and final products.  
 
Roles of Foresight for Governing in the Digital Era 
Foresight studies addressing the future of government (and the functions of public service) have 
been under-explored in policy studies. Westminster and US governance in the near to mid-future 
timeframe represent significant challenges relevant to foresight. National governments and 
regional economies are facing current challenges to their long-standing models of governance. 
The 2016 US national election turned out 60% of the population (McDonald, 2016), the lowest 
since 1942. In the US concerns with media presentation, campaign financing and management, 
multi-party relevance and the dominance of special interests present us with an historical 
challenge to governance integrity. Some analyses and forecasts (Adams, 2006) have suggested 
declining participation stems from perceived lack of relevance to individualized values, as 
Western societies (the US in particular) are split more between consumerist and conservative 
than right versus left. The trends of digital culture have not translated to online engagement with 
government. The shift to individualized sources of online media may lead to disconnection with 
government and the relevance of broader political issues. The political cycles of governing may 
also not help citizens maintain engagement between administrations. These problems have 
transitioned to Canada, although not to the extent of a systemic crisis, but sufficiently to witness 
the same trends in lower election turnouts, dissociation from politics, and absorption in digital 
culture.  
 
Even more dramatic social and economic shifts are on the near horizon as artificial intelligence, 
manufacturing automation, robotics, and algorithmic decision making become mainstream, and 
the horizon for their evolution becomes better understood. These developments offer 
governments immense opportunities to produce more efficient and effective services and 
policies, and might prove crucial in the state’s response to mounting social and economic 
challenges, such as aging societies and climate change that are already highlighting the limits of 
governments’ policy capacity. Yet, these emerging technologies along with disruptive industries 
(such as the so-called “sharing economy” of Uber and AirBnB) and disrupted traditional 
economies (such as automotive, journalism and television media) place new pressures on 
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governments to develop regulatory responses at a rapid pace and with an agility typically lacking 
in large hierarchical organizations.   
 
The Digital Era Governance project seeks to make a connection between these longer-term 
governance trends and address the possible scenarios through evidence-informed social 
foresight. The proposed program of research and engagement seeks to monitor emerging practice 
of digital tools and approaches, and explore the implications for possible futures. The goal is to 
influence the work and models of future governance and public service organization, and their 
relationship to citizens, firms, and non-profit organizations.  
 
Collaborative Foresight - Engaging Citizens and Stakeholders in Digital Governance 
A foresight-led design study was conducted by the OCAD University Strategic Innovation Lab 
(sLab) for the Digital Era Governance partnership convened between 2014-2015.  A synthesis 
map was produced in a series of stages over the engagement phases of the study, reflecting the 
contributions of invited citizens, conference delegates, and public engagement participants. The 
synthesis map (Figure 3) presents an integration of trend analysis and systemic analysis within an 
infographic-type map structured according to the Three Horizons foresight method. Analysis of 
long-term trends, social system drivers, signals of change, and system models were integrated 
into a large-scale map of the anticipated future tensions between government and prospective 
societal changes. 
 
While other foresight methods were considered for the initial phase of study, the synthesis map 
was chosen and developed due to its viability as a participatory foresight approach across 
multiple stakeholder engagements. Synthesis mapping (Jones and Bowes, 2016) is based on 
Sevaldson’s (2010) Gigamap technique, which recommends a creative studio process with 
stakeholders. The synthesis map method draws on research evidence (such as trend analysis) and 
direct expert knowledge, as appropriate for policy and evidence-based knowledge translation.  
Studio-based visual design was conducted in stages (without stakeholders) to construct the 
graphical dimensions of the map. 
 
Deliberative, constructive foresight methods such as scenario planning often present a 
prematurely narrowed focus on critical uncertainties and future scenarios as determined by 
expert analysis. The synthesis map methodology was considered appropriate for meeting several 
goals of the research partnership:  Capturing and representing perspectives from multiple 
stakeholders, identifying the most salient problems in future digital governance raised by experts 
and citizens, presenting a continuous snapshot of the evolution of learning among participants, 
and providing a durable visual thematic mapping of the systemic issues in the landscape of 
digital era governance.  
 
The synthesis map approach employs five stages:  1) domain and literature research, 2) content 
development from multiple sources and research analysis, employing visual notetaking, 3) initial 
knowledge synthesis into preliminary maps, 4) engagement, critique and evolution of maps, 5) 
iterative final map design. Unlike infographics, synthesis maps do not simplify and reduce 
complexity to present a narrative. Unlike other foresight methods, the synthesis map presents a 
single visual integration of multiple sources into a metaphorical narrative. This method is 
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intended to illustrate and integrate processes within coherent system boundaries. The aim to 
visually represent elements and relationships within the complexity of a large-scale, evolving 
social system as understood by the participants in that system. Our use of an open visual 
framework, partially annotated as in Figure 2, enabled a mixed group stakeholders to more 
effectively speculate about future developments. The map’s structure defined areas for 
contribution in relationship to time scales and to each other. By providing a scaffolding of 
concepts inviting participation, participants were able to identify new drivers and values 
associated with future issues.  
 
The synthesis map was developed over four participatory workshops, starting with a hand-drawn 
visual framework used in the initial public consultation (November, 2014). Drawing on the 
contributions from an Open Space workshop and participants’ direct interactions with the map, 
the research team continued to develop a structured framework adapting the Three Horizons 
(Curry and Hodgson, 2010) foresight method, annotated with contributions from the first stages of 
engagement. Figure 2 presents the framework developed after the first workshop, a line drawing 
representing the Three Horizons and the emerging issues drawn from research and participants 
identified as drivers (at the bottom of the map) and the conditional values at stake in the 
resolution between governance and the emerging digital culture, depicting fissures and stresses in 
the near term (Horizon 1) as digital culture impresses challenges and opens opportunities for 
innovation. A set of four staged scenarios in Horizon 3 was included to inspire narratives to 
inform these trajectories for these possible futures. 
 
 
The fully formed map2 in Figure 3 presents the synthesis of foresight contributions incorporated 
into the Three Horizons visual formalism.  The map is titled with a foresight question driving the 
inquiry (How might Canadian governance be transformed in the digital era?)  The question is 
both normative and descriptive, with responses interpreting values (that ought to be transformed) 
and trends (described as transformative). The essential model of the Three Horizons is retained, 
                                                          
2
 An earlier version of this synthesis map was published by Greg van Alstyne of the OCAD sLab in Canadian 
Government Executive, 21 (3) March 2015, pp. 13-15. 
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whereby the three prominent “hills” are aligned to time horizons associated with the model: 
Horizon 1 (H1): Present (2010s), H2: Near-term (2020s), and H3: Far-term (2030s).3 Horizon 1 
reflects established and uncontested values and norms associated with the ecosystems of 
Canadian governance (including First Nations, firms and institutions, and civil society): 
Democracy, fairness, justice, and security.  
 
A bridge connects H1 to H2, indicating the necessity for a secular shift to accommodate the 
anticipated change in society, or Digital Culture. The bridges at H1-H2 and at H2-H3 signify that 
large-scale innovation is necessary to connect society to new emerging regime of governance 
values as the new social systems become apparent (within current trends) in that relative time 
period. The values in H2 include those commonly identified with digital culture, while those in 
H3 reveal values found as desirable in the long term, inclusion, collaboration, and sustainability. 
Self-organization suggests a radical reordering of governance relationships in the shift to a 
“transformational” scenario. The final synthesis map did not visually present futures anticipated 
with the four scenarios, but the optimistic representation indicates the third horizon as an era 
with “digitally engaged citizens and public service.”  
 
 
                                                          
3
 The Three Horizons model lends itself to the development of visual metaphors to explain the relationships between 
structures in the map, such as the bridges to indicate the ideal extension of a horizon’s curve to the emerging 
innovations in the adjacent horizons. The “hills” are a common metaphorical extension as well. The waves of 
change were introduced as a visual form to show the constant and continuous assertion of drivers against the 
foundations of the horizons as change processes progressed. 
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Figure 3.  Digital Era Governance Synthesis Map4.  
 
A unique aspect of this foresight process was the inclusion of three influence maps (see the top of 
the map). These were constructed by stakeholder participants in the second workshop in the series, 
proposed as representative system cycles for emerging digital governance problems that Horizon 2 
policies must address. Subsets of participants (5-6 in each group) proposed the themes, generated 
the elements within the themes and linked them in provisional system maps according to influence 
logic. Each of the themes – Access Equity, Privacy, and Citizen Data Diffusion – were generated 
in response to a printed map based on the open framework in Figure 2. These were considered the 
most compelling concerns arising from the developing tensions between present era Canadian 
governance and the emerging digital culture. These concerns can be translated to public policy 
directives that might be addressed in response to the drivers and values identified in the earlier 
workshop engagements. As a digital governance problematique, the future problem space is 
represented by influence maps and their relations, as selected and co-created by workshop 
stakeholders. The inset system maps (causal loop form) are read from left to right, which reveal 
both temporal relationships as the issues propagate over time, and the relations of influence 
between these issues, stemming from the deep drivers (the left-most issues) to outcomes (right-
most). Online literacy links to the Privacy influence map, and Privacy to Data Diffusion. The 
content of the influence maps can be summarized as follows: 
  Access Equity – Should full citizens not have full access?  Access can be considered a 
public good and will be demanded as more of a utility in the future. Access equity 
implies the inequitable internet access currently provided by private firms across Canada 
might be resolved by ensuring universal access is afforded for government services, 
whether by subsidies or common carrier provisions. Near-term issues include 
“Government moves to online services,” “Uncertain access (rurals),” and “Battle with 
Bell.” These influence the bolded issues, which represent foreseeable outcomes for 
policy intervention: “Government services mandate internet,” “Earnings divide,” and 
eventually “All service accessible online,” and “Online literacy.”  
  Privacy and Profit – New Social Contracts? The second influence map anticipates the 
changing Canadian social contract due to changes in privacy and the regulatory policies. 
“Changing defaults” results from a renegotiation of privacy rights, as citizens start 
“watching the watchers.” Surveillance for security results in a government’s “Privacy 
erosion.” We also see unequal power relations between citizens who can afford to opt 
out.  “Private to open” reveals a positive Horizon 2 turn where a strong consumer data 
protection regime can be envisioned to counterbalance the trend to open data sharing. 
  Citizen Data Diffusion – Future public domain for data? The most future-oriented map 
describes citizen-owned data in H2 and H3 eras. As “Personal data becomes currency,” 
the need for regulation and control of citizen data sets will emerge in the H2 era of 
transparency and sharing. A future state of “Secular data transparency,” negotiates 
accessibility to “Government sources of personal data.” We also see the role for data 
                                                          
4
 The synthesis map was designed and produced in 2015 by an OCAD University sLab research team consisting of 
Greg van Alstyne, Peter Jones, Kelly Kornett, Patricia Kambitsch, Peter Scott, and Goran Matic. 
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governance and novel regulation, with “Data sense-making in government” and 
functions such as “Ambient data collection” within this system.  
 
This visual method based on inclusive, participatory elicitation was developed from a design 
action research methodology (Swann, 2002, Sein et al, 2011) and not typical foresight studies. 
The foresight products were not prepared by a research team working in isolation with access to 
experts and the literature. It enabled a transparent, traceable representation of contributions by 
multiple stakeholders over a series of engagements (annotated by participants in a series of 
interactive presentations and workshops). The combination of visual templating, partial horizon 
scanning and incomplete scenario definition has not been reported among the scenario methods 
in foresight literature. Instead the design research approach developed a consensus set of trends 
and future outcome issues for digital governance problems, defined largely by experts and 
citizens in series of stakeholder engagements. 
 
The Three Horizons synthesis map represents only the first stage to develop the scope and key 
themes from eliciting digital governance trends, drivers, and systemic relationships and 
outcomes over a long time horizon. Continuing foresight-led participatory research is planned for 
further development within a research process for the digital era governance partnership. An 
online, accessible foresight platform provided over the period of the partnership project will 
provide a repository and communication system for capturing the results of trends analyses and 
signals identification, system maps and models, expert and content analyses, and elicited 
stakeholder contributions from workshops and engagements. 
 
There are three major challenge areas planned for continuing study to benefit from foresight 
research:   How are Canadian public services innovating?   How are Westminster institutions evolving?    What are the emerging models for collaboration & performance? 
 
 
The design action research process follows a well-known AR cycle of Problem Framing, 
Intervention and Evaluation, Reflection and Learning, and we add Mobilization/Socialization as 
a cyclic process of interaction through the online platform. The primary purpose of the foresight 
platform is to systematically collect and coordinate diverse futures perspectives across a large 
research partnership, with numerous planned and emergent research objectives within the three 
main challenge areas. Foresight enables the partnership to undertake diverse lines of inquiry in 
research and discussion forums, and well as monitoring emerging data and trends, knowing that 
they can be integrated into more coherent narratives and perspectives.   
 
We expect to develop foresight findings from pre-existing work in the corpus (published studies 
and partnership data) to develop initial foresight products, including the synthesis map and its 
relevant trends. The research process will develop further stakeholder knowledge from 
conferences and workshops, both presenting current findings and eliciting new contributions 
within workshop sessions. Foresight methods for each engagement will be selected for futures 
(signals and trends) data collection, evaluation of current models, and the potential for further 
scenario development. Stakeholder surveys, Horizon 2 and H3 scenarios, outcome mapping, 
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future and options analysis, and further systemic mapping research are considered leading 
methods to guide the socio-technological research in the project. Visualization techniques such 
as synthesis mapping will be employed to develop models of systems and causal relationships in 
future problem areas, as research enabling policy, leadership and institutional guidance. A 
central challenge in governance foresight will be to formulate scenarios, possible trajectories, 
preferred futures and strategic options which include governance, public administration, and 
leadership styles in concert with policy studies. Overall, the foresight research not only develops 
the challenges and opportunities for the future of Westminster government, it aims to contribute 
to digital governance and Canadian policymaking.  
Foresight as Anticipatory Design 
We are challenged with social research aiming to inform future policy and decisions – the extent 
to which we rely on research evidence, we risk the cognitive bias of anchoring (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1973) in data and conclusions drawn from “the past” as the problem of concern 
continues to evolve into future uncertainty. Yet foresight methods cannot be effectively “dropped 
in” to policy development and initiative planning. As with the FORLEARN project and the 
Digital Era Governance synthesis map, the appropriate applications of strategic foresight are 
“designed in” to emerging and existing processes within public administration.  
 
Design thinking and design disciplines (such as service design and user experience) have made 
substantial inroads in government and public service projects, often through the proliferation of 
government services and innovation labs. A survey of the proportion of design projects in public 
sector applications shows “design” yielding most of its added value downstream from policy 
development, in the formulation of service delivery and implementation of policy instruments 
such as procedures, online services, and better end user products to citizens. The definition of 
agendas and long-term planning for policy has not yielded significantly to design co-creation 
approaches. 
 
If we examine the commonly accepted models of design thinking in policy studies the 
disconnection from foresight or formal anticipatory insight becomes apparent. Junginger (2013) 
presents policymaking as a design process, extending the policy-centric models of Peters (Linder 
and Peters, 1984) and Howlett (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995) from a multidisciplinary design 
perspective. Developing the stages of design thinking within policy development, the staged 
model of Howlett and Ramesh (1995) is extended and critiqued. Juninger shows that design 
practices (to date, primarily) have only occupied the policy implementation and evaluation 
stages, and have yet to enhance or contribute to the formative policymaking stages. The most 
significant obstacle to foresight design practice lies in the insular institutional culture of 
government policy organization. The envisioning of future digital era governance proposals 
might first resolve the problem of access and then continue to advocate the content value of 
strategic foresight as a complementary practice in evidence-based culture.   
 
Strategic foresight obviously will remain ineffective if conducted downstream from formative 
policy design (agenda setting and concept development) as it will appear as ancillary advice and 
not influential input. The inclusion of foresight modes in policy design must take into account 
the staging of processes in the policy cycle. Foresight itself ought to become an integral practice 
contributing to the design of policy options over different timeframes of strategic selection of 
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options. However, the definition of policy agendas and long-term planning remains a largely 
expert-driven process. The fuzzy front-end stages of policy formulation are politically 
developed, and perhaps for this reason have not invited methodologies such as stakeholder co-
creation or design thinking, as in the commercial sectors. Foresight may be uniquely adaptive to 
early policy formation, as the argument can be made that high quality observations about future 
trajectories relevant to a policy, even if based on uncertain present-day evidence, have a direct 
effect on the content and strategy of policy formulation. Especially in the realm of digital era 
governance, the access to rapidly evolving trends and foresight models describing the trajectory 
of digital culture, such as developed in the case project for example, should inform policymakers 
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